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Hedge Fund
Scholarly Compositions - Featured Authors
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Dr. Chris Brooks
Professor of Finance,
CASS Business School
City University London
Academic Home Page
Brief Bio:
Chris was formerly
Professor of Finance at the ISMA Centre, University of Reading,
where he also obtained his PhD and BA in Economics and Econometrics.
His areas of research interest include econometric modelling and
forecasting, risk measurement, asset management, and property
finance. He has published over sixty articles in leading academic
and practitioner journals, including the Journal of Business, the
Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Empirical Finance, Oxford
Bulletin and Economic Journal. Chris is Associate Editor of several
journals, including the International Journal of Forecasting. He is
also author of the best-selling textbook, “Introductory Econometrics
for Finance” (2000, Cambridge University Press).
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Dr. Brooks' Table of Contents
in chronological order
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Speculative Bubbles in the S&P 500: Was
the Tech Bubble Confined to the Tech Sector?
by Chris Brooks & Apostolos Katsaris
October, 2005
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The Stock Performance of America's 100
Best Corporate Citizens
by Chris Brooks, Stephen Brammer, & Stephen Pavelin
October, 2005
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Timing is Everything: A Comparison and
Evaluation of Market Timing Strategies
by Chris Brooks, Apostolos Katsaris, & Gita Persand
October, 2005
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Cross Hedging with Single Stock Futures
by Chris Brooks, Ryan J. Davies, & Sang Soo Kim
July 1, 2005
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Corporate Social Performance and Stock
Returns: UK Evidence from Disaggregate Measures
by Chris Brooks, Stephen Brammer, & Stephen Pavelin
June 2005
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Decomposing the Price-Earnings Ratio
by Chris Brooks & Keith P. Anderson
May 2005
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The Long-Term Price-Earnings Ratio
by Chris Brooks & Keith P. Anderson
May 2005
-
Extreme Returns from Extreme Value Stocks:
Enhancing the Value Premium
by Chris Brooks & Keith P. Anderson
April 2005
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Corporate Reputation and Stock Returns:
Are Good Firms Good for Investors?
by Chris Brooks, Stephen Brammer, & Stephen Pavelin
December 2004
-
Gambling on the S&P 500's Gold Seal: New
Evidence on the Index Effect
by Chris Brooks, Konstantina Kappou, & Charles W.R. Ward
December 2004
-
Regime Switching Models of Speculative
Bubbles with Volume: An Empirical Investigation of the S&P 500
Composite Index
by Chris Brooks & Apostolos Katsaris
June 2003
-
The Impact of News on Measures of
Undiversifiable Risk: Evidence from the UK Stock Market
by Chris Brooks & Olan T. Henry
2002
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The
Statistical Properties of Hedge Fund Index Returns and their
Implications for Investors
by Chris Brooks & Harry M. Kat
November 10, 2001
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Speculative Bubbles in the S&P 500: Was the Tech Bubble Confined
to the Tech Sector?
by Chris Brooks & Apostolos Katsaris
City University London, & Caliburn Capital Partners LLP
October, 2005
Abstract
This study tests for the presence of periodically, partially
collapsing speculative bubbles in the sector indices of the S&P
500 using a regime-switching approach. We also employ an
augmented model that includes trading volume as a technical
indicator to improve the ability of the model to time bubble
collapses and to better capture the temporal variations in
returns. We find that over 70% of the S&P 500 index by market
capitalization, and seven of its ten sector component indices
exhibited bubble-like behaviour over our sample period. Thus the
speculative bubble that grew in the 1990's and subsequently
collapsed was pervasive in the US equity market. The bubble
affected numerous sectors including energy and industrials,
rather than being confined to information technology,
telecommunications and the media.
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The Stock Performance of America's 100 Best Corporate Citizens
by Chris Brooks, Stephen Brammer, & Stephen Pavelin
City University London, University of Bath, & University of
Reading
October, 2005
Abstract
This study considers the stock performance of America's 100 Best
Corporate Citizens following the annual survey by Business
Ethics. We examine both possible short-term announcement effects
around the time of the survey's publication, and whether
longer-term returns are higher for firms that are listed as good
citizens. We find some evidence of a positive market reaction to
a firm's presence in the top 100 firms that are made public, and
that holders of the stock of such firms earn small abnormal
returns during an announcement window. Over the year following
the announcement, companies in the top 100 yield negative
abnormal returns of around 3%. However, such companies tend to
be large and with high price-to-book values, which existing
studies suggest will tend to perform poorly. Once we allow for
these firm characteristics, the poor performance of the highly
rated firms largely disappears. We also find companies that are
newly listed as good citizens and companies in the top 100 but
outside the S&P 500 can provide considerable positive abnormal
returns to investors.
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Timing is Everything: A Comparison and Evaluation of Market
Timing Strategies
by Chris Brooks, Apostolos Katsaris, & Gita Persand
City University London, Caliburn Capital Partners LLP, &
University of Bristol
October, 2005
Abstract
Following early failures, more recent empirical evidence has
suggested that timing entries to and exits from equity markets
may be feasible. A number of approaches to this most basic form
of dynamic asset allocation are available, but which works best?
This study investigates the relative profitability of several
different methodologies using a very long dataset on the S&P
500. In order to overcome the accusations of data snooping and
arbitrary parameter choice that beset much previous work in this
area, we carefully consider whether the rule performance is
sensitive to the specified user-adjustable parameters. We find
that all but one of the approaches are able to beat a
buy-and-hold equities strategy in risk-adjusted terms, although
a strategy based on the difference between the earnings-price
ratio and short term Treasury yields works best.
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Cross Hedging
with Single Stock Futures
by Chris Brooks, Ryan J. Davies, & Sang Soo Kim
City University London, Babson College, & University of Reading
July 1, 2005
Abstract
This study evaluates the efficiency of cross hedging with single
stock futures (SSF) contracts. We propose a new technique for
hedging exposure to an individual stock that does not have
options or exchange-traded SSF contracts written on it. Our
method selects as a hedging instrument a portfolio of SSF
contracts which are selected based on how closely matched their
underlying firm characteristics are with the characteristics of
the individual stock we are attempting to hedge. We investigate
whether using cross-sectional characteristics to construct our
hedge can provide hedging efficiency gains over that of
constructing the hedge based on return correlations alone.
Overall, we find that the best hedging performance is achieved
through a portfolio that is hedged with market index futures and
a SSF matched by both historical return correlation and
cross-sectional matching characteristics. We also find it
preferable to retain the chosen SSF contracts for the whole
out-of-sample period while re-estimating the optimal hedge ratio
at each rolling window.
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Corporate Social Performance and Stock Returns: UK Evidence from
Disaggregate Measures
by Chris Brooks, Stephen Brammer, & Stephen Pavelin
City University London, University of Bath, & University of
Reading
June 2005
Abstract
This study examines the relationship between corporate social
performance and stock returns in the UK. Using a set of
disaggregated social performance indicators for environment,
employment and community activities, we are able to more closely
evaluate the interactions between social and financial
performance than would be the case for an aggregate measure.
While scores on a composite social performance indicator are
significantly negatively related to stock returns, we find that
the poor financial reward offered by such firms is attributable
to their good social performance on the employment and to a
lesser extent the environmental aspects. Interestingly, we find
that considerable abnormal returns are available from holding a
portfolio of the socially least desirable stocks. These
relationships between social and financial performance cannot be
rationalised by multi-factor models for explaining the
cross-sectional variation in returns or by industry effects.
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Decomposing the
Price-Earnings Ratio
by Chris Brooks & Keith P. Anderson
University of Reading - ICMA Centre & City University London -
Sir John Cass Business School
May 2005
Abstract
The price-earnings ratio is a widely used measure of the
expected performance of companies, and it has almost invariably
been calculated as the ratio of the current share price to the
previous year's earnings. However, the P/E of a particular stock
is partly determined by outside influences such as the year in
which it is measured, the size of the company, and the sector in
which the company operates. Examining all UK companies since
1975, we propose a modified price-earnings ratio that decomposes
these influences. We then use a regression to weight the factors
according to their power in predicting returns. The decomposed
price-earnings ratio is able to double the gap in annual returns
between the value and glamour deciles, and thus constitutes a
useful tool for value fund managers and hedge funds.
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The Long-Term
Price-Earnings Ratio
by Chris Brooks & Keith P. Anderson
University of Reading - ICMA Centre & City University London -
Sir John Cass Business School
May 2005
Abstract
The price-earnings effect has been thoroughly documented
and widely studied around the world. However, in existing
research it has almost exclusively been calculated on the basis
of the previous year's earnings. We show that the power of the
effect has until now been seriously underestimated, due to
taking too short-term a view of earnings. We look at all UK
companies since 1975, and using the traditional P/E ratio we
find the difference in average annual returns between the value
and glamour deciles to be 6%, similar to other authors'
findings. We are able to almost double the value premium by
calculating P/E ratios using earnings averaged over the last
eight years. Averaging, however, implies equal weights for each
past year. We further enhance the premium by optimising the
weights of the past years of earnings in constructing the P/E
ratio.
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Extreme Returns from Extreme Value Stocks: Enhancing the Value
Premium
by Chris Brooks & Keith P. Anderson
University of Reading - ICMA Centre & City University London -
Sir John Cass Business School
April 2005
Abstract
Investigations into value-based 'anomalies' such as the
P/E effect typically sort shares into quintiles, or at most
deciles. These are blunt instruments. We test whether most of
the extra value to be found in the lower end of the P/E spectrum
is to be found in the very lowest P/E shares, and whether the
worst investments are in the few shares with the highest P/E.
Using a long-term definition of earnings, and attributing
influences on the P/E to company size and sector, we find that
small portfolios of value shares give returns of 40%+ per annum,
while small portfolios of glamour shares give returns less than
the risk-free rate. We thus show that by a more judicious use of
the P/E ratio, we can considerably enhance the value premium.
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Corporate Reputation and Stock Returns: Are Good Firms Good for
Investors?
by Chris Brooks, Stephen Brammer, & Stephen Pavelin
City University of London, University of Bath, & University of
Reading
December 2004
Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between a firm's reputation
and the returns on its shares. We employ a unique dataset from
the UK based on ten years of surveys conducted for Management
Today, where company directors and analysts at leading
investment firms are asked to rate each company in their sector.
We consider whether there may be a short-term effect around the
time of the announcement and whether longer-term returns are
superior for highly ranked firms. We find that while there is
little evidence for short-term price pressure around the time of
the event, investors who purchase stocks with reputation scores
that have risen significantly can make abnormal returns.
Consistent with the notion that there is no such thing as bad
publicity, we find that firm's whose scores have fallen
substantially still exhibit positive abnormal returns in both
the short and long run when the market index is employed as a
benchmark. However, when a more appropriate comparator is used,
evidence of out-performance entirely disappears.
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Gambling on the S&P 500's Gold Seal: New Evidence on the Index
Effect
by Chris Brooks, Konstantina Kappou, & Charles W.R. Ward
City University of London & University of Reading
December 2004
Abstract
This study examines the abnormal returns, trading activity and
long term performance of stocks that were added to the S&P 500
Index during the period 1990 to 2002. By using a three-factor
pricing model that allows for firm size and value
characteristics as well as market risk, we are able to shed new
light on the widely observed 'index effect'. We argue that for
the years 1990-1997 in particular, firm size mattered in the
long-run and firm size effects cannot be captured by a single
factor model for abnormal returns. We also find a transitory
increase in trading volume between the announcement and a few
days after the effective date. The 'seal' of S&P 500 Index
membership has very long term effects and inclusion is not an
information-free event.
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Regime Switching Models of Speculative Bubbles with Volume: An
Empirical Investigation of the S&P 500 Composite Index
by Chris Brooks & Apostolos Katsaris
City University of London & Caliburn Capital Partners LLP
June 2003
Abstract
In this paper we test for the presence of periodically partially
collapsing, positive and negative speculative bubbles in the S&P
500 Composite Index for the period 1888-2003. We extend existing
regime - Switching models of speculative behavior by including
abnormal volume as an indicator of the probable time of the
bubble collapse. Abnormal volume is included as both a
classifying variable that helps predict the probability of the
bubble surviving, and as a factor of risk in the surviving state
equation. Increased volume is considered a signal that market
beliefs concerning the future of the bubble are changing. We
show that the deviation of actual prices from fundamental values
and abnormal volume are significant predictors and classifiers
of returns.
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The Impact of News on Measures of Undiversifiable Risk: Evidence
from the UK Stock Market
by Chris Brooks & Olan T. Henry
City University of London & University of Melbourne
2002
Abstract
Using UK equity index data, this paper considers the impact of
news on time varying measures of beta, the usual measure of
undiversifiable risk. The results suggest that beta depends on
two sources of news - news about the market and news about the
sector. The asymmetric effect in beta is consistent across all
sectors considered. Recent research provides conflicting
evidence as to whether abnormalities in equity returns are a
result of changes in expected returns in an efficient market or
an over-reaction to new information. The evidence in this paper
suggests that such abnormalities may occur as a result of
changes in expected return caused by time-variation and symmetry
in beta.
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The Statistical Properties of
Hedge Fund Index Returns and their Implications for Investors
by Chris Brooks & Harry M. Kat
ISMA Centre
November 10, 2001
Abstract
The monthly return distributions of many hedge fund
indices exhibit highly unusual skewness and kurtosis properties
as well as first-order serial correlation. This has important
consequences for investors. We demonstrate that although hedge
fund indices are highly attractive in mean-variance terms, this
is much less the case when skewness, kurtosis, and
autocorrelation are taken into account. Sharpe Ratios will
substantially overestimate the true risk-return performance of
(portfolios containing) hedge funds. Similarly, mean-variance
portfolio analysis will over-allocate to hedge funds and
overestimate the attainable benefits from including hedge funds
in an investment portfolio. We also find substantial differences
between indices that aim to cover the same type of strategy.
Investors' perceptions of hedge fund performance and value added
will therefore strongly depend on the indices used.
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